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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Weston Lloyd Ballard appeals from the district court's order revoking his 
probation and executing, without reduction, the underlying unified sentence of seven 
years, with three years fixed, imposed and suspended upon his plea of guilty to felony 
DUI. On appeal, Mr. Ballard asserts that the Idaho Supreme Court has denied him due 
process of law and equal protection by refusing to augment the record with transcripts 
of his original sentencing hearing, rider review hearing, and first probation violation 
disposition hearing. Additionally, Mr. Ballard asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion when it revoked his probation and executed his original sentence without sua 
sponte reducing it. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
This case began when Mr. Ballard was charged with felony driving while under 
the influence of intoxicants 1 (hereinafter, DUI), felony fleeing or attempting to elude a 
peace officer, and receiving or transferring stolen vehicles. (R., pp.49-53.) The parties 
then entered into a non-binding Idaho Criminal Rule 11 plea agreement under the terms 
of which Mr. Ballard agreed, inter alia, to plead guilty to DUI and to the amended charge 
of misdemeanor fleeing or attempting to elude an officer, in exchange for which the 
State would dismiss the receiving or transferring stolen vehicles charge and recommend 
that any sentences on the two charges to which he pleaded guilty would run 
concurrently. (R., pp.57-62.) 
1 The charge was elevated to a felony based on the allegation that Mr. Ballard had twice 
been convicted of DUI in the ten years preceding the current charge. (R., p.54.) 
1 
Pursuant to the agreement, Mr. Ballard pleaded guilty to DUI and misdemeanor 
fleeing or attempting to elude an officer. (R., pp.66-67.) Ultimately, the district court 
sentenced Mr. Ballard to a unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, on 
the DUI charge, while retaining jurisdiction.2 (R., pp.85-86.) Following his rider, the 
district court suspended Mr. Ballard's sentence and placed him on a period of probation 
of five years. (R., p.94.) Mr. Ballard later admitted to violating the conditions of his 
probation, and his probation was continued with additional conditions added, including a 
requirement that he complete an inpatient substance abuse treatment program. 
(R., pp.162-66.) 
Mr. Ballard was then alleged to have violated his probation as follows: by 
consuming alcohol, failing to attend aftercare following his completion of the inpatient 
treatment program, failing to complete sixty hours of community service, operating a 
motor vehicle without insurance and driving privileges, failing to obey all laws, changing 
residence without permission, failing to report to his probation officer as directed, and 
failing to make himself "available to supervision and program participation as instructed 
by the probation officer" and not actively avoid supervision. (R., pp.190-93, 205-07.) 
At the evidentiary hearing, the sole witness called was Mr. Ballard's probation 
officer, Jennifer Adler. Ms. Adler testified that she learned from Mr. Ballard's former 
landlord that he had been evicted from his last known address several months earlier, 
and that Mr. Ballard did not report this eviction or provide a new address to the 
probation department.3 (Tr., p.2, L.16 - p.3, L.11.) She further testified that, for the 
2 The sentence received on Mr. Ballard's misdemeanor eluding charge amounted to 
time-served, and is therefore moot for purposes of this appeal. 
3 Defense counsel did not object to Mr. Ballard's probation officer testifying as to 
hearsay statements that she purportedly learned from his former landlord. See State v. 
Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 768 (2007) (a probationer enjoys a due process right to confront 
2 
months of January and February 2011, Mr. Ballard failed to report to the probation 
department "about every other week" and did not return her phone messages as he was 
supposed to do. (Tr., p.3, L.16 - pA, L.13.) 
Ms. Adler then testified that, although Mr. Ballard completed the inpatient 
treatment program as ordered, he failed to attend aftercare, which she learned by 
talking to his counselor in the program, whom she said was named either Dale or Dan.4 
(Tr., p.5, L.17 - p.6, L.17.) With respect to the allegation that Mr. Ballard had failed to 
complete sixty hours of community service as a condition of probation, Ms. Adler 
testified that she had received no documentation from Mr. Ballard that he had 
completed the community service. (Tr., p.6, L.18 - p.7, L.12.) 
The State then withdrew the allegation that Mr. Ballard had consumed alcohol, 
and sought to replace the allegation that he had failed to obey all laws by driving without 
privileges with an allegation that he failed to obey all laws by being convicted of 
domestic battery and theft. (Tr., p.7, L.13 - p.8, L.2.) Defense counsel then stipulated 
"that he violated the law while on probation based on an incident that happened January 
8th." (Tr., p.10, Ls.22-24.) The district court then found Mr. Ballard in violation of 
probation as to all but the withdrawn allegation. (Tr., p.15, Ls.13-16.) 
At the hearing on disposition of Mr. Ballard's probation, defense counsel 
requested that the district court send Mr. Ballard on a rider that focused on his 
substance abuse problems, rather than the traditional rider in which he had previously 
participated. (Tr., p.18, Ls.5-22.) The State requested that the district court revoke 
witnesses absent the district court making "a specific finding of good cause" to dispense 
with confrontation). 
4 Again, defense counsel did not object to the use of hearsay statements purportedly 
made by a person the probation officer identified as either Dale or Dan in establishing a 
violation of this condition. See note 3. 
3 
probation and execute the original sentence. (Tr., p.18, L.25 - p.19, L.7.) Ultimately, 
the district court revoked probation, and ordered execution of the underlying sentence 
without reduction. (Tr., p.30, Ls.2-6.) 
Mr. Ballard filed a Notice of Appeal from the district court's order revoking 
probation.5 (R., p.237.) 
On appeal, Mr. Ballard filed a motion to augment and suspend, requesting the 
preparation of transcripts of his original sentencing hearing, his rider review hearing, 
and the hearing on the disposition of his first probation violation proceeding. (Motion to 
Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof.) 
The State filed an objection to this motion. (Objection to "Motion to Augment and to 
Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof'.) The Supreme 
Court then issued an order denying Mr. Ballard's motion. (Order Denying Motion to 
Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule.) 
5 Mr. Ballard filed a Rule 35 motion requesting the reduction of the fixed portion of his 
sentence to two years, with an increase of the indeterminate portion to five years. That 




1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Ballard due process and equal protection 
when it denied his motion to augment with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Ballard's probation 




The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Ballard Due Process And Equal Protection When 
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent 
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the 
defendant intends to raise on appeal. The only way a court can constitutionally 
preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove 
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal. 
In this case, Mr. Ballard filed a Motion to Augment, requesting various transcripts 
and argued that, when determining whether to revoke probation, a district court can 
consider all of the hearings before and after sentencing. On appeal, Mr. Ballard is 
challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for the transcripts. 
Mr. Ballard asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the district court's 
asserted failure to reduce his sentence upon revoking probation because that decision 
was made after the original sentencing hearing, and the district court could have, 
therefore, relied on its memory of the hearings in question when it decided to revoke 
probation and execute the underlying sentence. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court 
erred in denying Mr. Ballard's request. 
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B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Ballard Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The 
Requested Transcripts 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Ballard With 
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit-Based Appellate Review Of His 
Claims 
The Constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 10. CONST. art. 
I § 13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981 ). 
State V. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State V. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United 
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United 
States Constitution to Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh V. State, 
132 Idaho 221,227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is statutory. See I.C. § 19-2801. 
Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, the cost of 
such transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a). 
Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates the 
production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. I.C.R. 5.2(a). 
Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .. 
. . " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to 
7 
be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as 
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a). 
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these cases. 
The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection 
clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent defendants 
and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second theme limits the 
states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for review. The states do 
not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they request. In order to meet 
the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection, the states must 
provide indigent defendants with appellate records unless some or all of the requested 
materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State 
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to 
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts 
8 
themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was 
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants 
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p1roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At 
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
9 
In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In 
that case, the state argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of 
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to 
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access 
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less 
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase 
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of 
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement 
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the 
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for 
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be 
10 
adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument that 
he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State 
wants the defendant's request to be denied, it is the State's burden to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id. This authority has been 
recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals. See 
Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 
2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 2007). 
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation 
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a transcript was 
necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the 
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must provide an 
adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed. "It is well established that an 
appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate 
court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of 
the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial 
I court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999). If the transcripts are missing, 
but the record contains court minutes, that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful 
I II 
review of [an appellant's] claim is possible, although the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
I "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel not rely on the district court minutes to 
11 
provide an adequate record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 
491 (Ct. App. 1999). In this case, Mr. Ballard presents as an issue on appeal the 
question of whether the district court erred by revoking his probation and by failing to 
sua sponte reduce his sentence when it revoked his probation. The transcript of the 
January 28, 2008, sentencing hearing is necessary because trial counsel addressed the 
court in mitigation. Additionally, a transcript of the September 8, 2008, probation 
violation admission hearing is relevant because mitigation arguments were made in 
favor of Mr. Ballard. (R., p.42.) If Mr. Ballard fails to provide the appellate court with the 
requested items, the legal presumption will apply and Mr. Ballard's claims will not be 
addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action alone which prevents his access to 
the requested items, then such action is a violation of due process, as per Lane, and 
any such presumption should no longer apply. 
Mr. Ballard spoke to the district court at his sentencing hearing (R., p.83), but 
appellate counsel does not know what he said because this Court denied his request 
that transcripts of that hearing be prepared. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to 
Suspend the Briefing Schedule.) He also "spoke on his own behalf" at the retained 
jurisdiction review hearing on March 2, 2009 (R., p.93); again, appellate counsel does 
not know what he said because this Court denied his request that a transcript of that 
hearing be prepared. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule.) Finally, at his previous probation violation and disposition hearing, at which 
I the district court continued Mr. Ballard's probation, Mr. Ballard admitted to violating the 
terms and conditions of his probation, which demonstrate an acceptance of 
responsibility for his misconduct while on probation; appellate counsel does not know 
how much responsibility Mr. Ballard accepted or whether he addressed the district court 
12 
with respect to disposition because this Court denied his request that a transcript of that 
hearing be prepared. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule.) 
All three of the requested transcripts are within an Idaho appellate court's scope 
of review. The transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all 
proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court appropriately 
revoked probation. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we 
review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will 
examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. 
We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as 
events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation.") 
(emphasis added). Additionally, failure to include a transcript on appeal results in the 
application of a presumption that the missing transcript supports the actions of the 
district court. See State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Burdett has 
failed to include the transcript from his change of plea hearing wherein, according to the 
district court minutes, he was examined by the court regarding his guilty plea. Portions 
of a transcript missing on appeal are presumed to support the actions of the district 
court."). 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
I due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of 
I~ proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Ballard's Motion to Augment will 
I 
render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts 
support the district court's order revoking probation. This functions as a procedural bar 
to the review of Mr. Ballard's appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore, 
13 
Mr. Ballard should either be provided with the requested transcripts, or the presumption 
should not be applied. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Ballard With 
Access To The Requested Transcript, Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated against the states 
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, the United 
States Supreme Court reasoned that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably 
related to due process that the denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a 
hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 64. The Supreme Court also stated that, under the facts 
of Powell "the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure to make 
an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... [and to] hold otherwise would be to ignore 
the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 'that there are certain immutable 
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free government which no member 
of the Union may disregard.'" Id. at 65 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898)). 
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny in determining that the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants with 
counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of Douglas 
was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. According to the 
United States Supreme Court: 
In short, the promise of Doug/as that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
14 
II: I 
has a right to counsel at trialOwould be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
According to the United States Supreme Court, to be constitutionally effective 
appellate counsel must make a conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in 
support of the best arguments to be made. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 
(1967). In Anders, the Court held that the constitutional requirements of substantial 
equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an active 
advocate on behalf of his client .... [counsel's1 role as advocate requires that he 
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." Id.; see also Banuelos v. State, 
127 Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcripts has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination 
of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether 
there is factual support either in favor of any argument made or undercutting any 
argument made. Therefore, Mr. Ballard has not obtained review of the court 
proceedings based on the merits and cannot receive the effective assistance of counsel 
that is guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129,137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
the starting point of evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of counsel 
in a criminal action is the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION. These standards still offer insight into the role and 
responsibilities of defense counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
15 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . .. Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-B.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
decision to revoke probation. Further, appellate counsel is unable to advise Mr. Ballard 
on the probable role the transcripts may play in this appeal. 
Mr. Ballard is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the requested 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Ballard his 
constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of 
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access 
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any 
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Ballard's Probation And 
When It Failed To Reduce His Sentence Sua Sponte Upon Revoking His Probation 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Ballard asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked his 
probation and executed the underlying sentence without sua sponte reducing it in light 
of the mitigating factors present and the district court's mistaken belief that Mr. Ballard 
had previously participated in two riders in this case. 
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B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Ballard's 
Probation And Executed The Underlying Sentence Without Sua Sponte 
Reducing It 
Two issues that arise in probation revocation proceedings and are relevant here, 
both of which are discretionary, are: (1) whether probation should be revoked, and (2) 
"if a prison sentence previously has been pronounced but suspended, should that 
sentence be ordered into execution or should the court order a reduced sentence as 
authorized by I.C.R. 35." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001) (citation 
omitted); see also State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592, 594 (2008) (upon revoking 
probation, "the court can sua sponte reduce the sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35"). 
At the disposition hearing on Mr. Ballard's probation violations, the district court 
declined to send Mr. Ballard on what would have been a second rider in this case, 
explaining that he had already completed two riders in this case, and concluding that it 
would be inappropriate to grant him "a third retained jurisdiction in this matter." 
(Tr., p.28, L.21 - p.30, L.1.) The district court's belief, that Mr. Ballard had previously 
completed two riders in this case, was incorrect. (See generally, R.) 
At the disposition hearing, Mr. Ballard was given the opportunity to speak on his 
own behalf. Mr. Ballard provided a thorough and thoughtful explanation as to why he 
felt that his probation had been unsuccessful, including describing his attempts to 
abstain from alcohol as "an ongoing struggle" and his life's goal as "remain[ing] sober 
for the rest of my life." Mr. Ballard explained that he has "been an alcoholic probably 
since 12, 13 years old," having grown up in an alcoholic family, in which his immediate 
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and extended family, as well as people in his community,6 regularly drank to excess. 
He went on to acknowledge that it was "my fault that I relapsed" and that, once he had 
relapsed, he figured that he had failed at his recovery and continued to relapse. He 
now intends to "continue to learn about alcohol and drugs so that I can overcome my 
addiction to be a - someway, somehow to be a positive role model in my community, 
especially the community out there in Fort Hall, the reservation." He concluded by 
noting that he needed help, and that he "could see myself in a, in a better light when I'm 
sober; and my thoughts and my, my thinking are clear." (Tr., p.19, L.10 - p.26, L.7.) 
Mr. Ballard submitted three exhibits in support of his request that he be given 
another rider. One of those exhibits was a letter from his fiancee, in which she 
explained that she is a sober influence in his life, and explained that she supported 
Mr. Ballard because he "has made positive attempts on changing his lifestyle, beliefs 
and working to provide for, and become family oriented. He supports my 4 children as a 
father figure and a provider to the household." She went on to request that the district 
court allow him to participate in a treatment program in a local facility. (Defendant's 
Exhibit A.) Another exhibit was a certificate of completion for the Anger Management 
Course at the Fort Hall Detention Center while he was awaiting disposition on his 
probation violations. (Defendant's Exhibit B.) 
In light of the district court's mistaken belief that Mr. Ballard had already 
completed two riders for this case, and the mitigating circumstances known to the 
district court at the time of the probation disposition hearing, Mr. Ballard asserts that the 
6 Mr. Ballard is a Native American who was raised on a reservation. (Presentence 
Investigation Report File, pp.1, 8.) 
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district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and failed to reduce his 
sentence sua sponte upon revoking his probation. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ballard respectfully requests that this Court order that he be placed on 
probation in this case. In the alternative, he requests that this Court reduce his 
sentence as it deems appropriate, or remand this matter to the district court for a new 
probation disposition hearing. 
DATED this 15th day of June, 2012. 
II' I 
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